Yesterday, I wrote the first in a three-part series about the US military industrial complex. If you didn’t get a chance to read it, do so before reading today’s installment.
How did a 21-year-old Massachusetts Air National Guardsman manage to post some of the nation’s most closely guarded military intelligence on a video game platform?
Think about it. How did that possibly happen? Again.
Jon Stewart’s interview with Deputy Defense Secretary Hicks explained the situation perfectly. During a contentious exchange she revealed the reason why the Pentagon cannot meet its lawful obligations to pass a congressionally-mandated audit: “we don’t have an accurate inventory that we can pull up of what we have, where.”
There you go.
Apparently the Department of Defense has grown too large to count. It is impossible to manage something that cannot be measured. This is a strategic failure of epic dimensions and deserves exploration. How is that possible? More importantly, what are the implications for military readiness within an institution that is so poorly managed and out of control?
During the Second World War the American Armed Forces comprised 16 million active duty forces. As of 2022, the US Military had a force of 1.18 million total active duty and reserve forces.
During World War II the US Military had nearly 1,100 general officers. Today it has 620. Remarkably, there are more four-star officers on active duty today than when there was a force of 16 million fighting a global war.
How can this be explained? Is this good for the United States and the national defense? Does more generals mean a more lethal and professional military? How big are general officer’s personal staffs? General Petraeus was hardly the exception when he rolled in a motorcade that included 28 motorcycle cops.
I wonder if a future version of an AI Chatbot might be asked to analyze the situation through the prism of an artificial USMC gunnery sergeant. Wouldn’t the likely response be pretty close to “who the f@$k is in charge here?”
Jon Stewart suggested to the deputy defense secretary that there was a deep interconnection between a host of issues that are rooted within a matrix of waste, fraud, mismanagement and bureaucracy that ladder downward, and profoundly impact the soldier and veteran at the bottom rung.
Stewart focused much of his interview on the intransigence of a bureaucracy that seems immune to considering the human costs associated with the deadly business of war-making. Specifically, Stewart focused on America’s veterans. His questions were rooted in his long-term advocacy for the interests of the soldiers and first responders who were at the front through 20 years of war. He has been singularly effective at piercing a veil of performative patriotism, while expressing moral outrage about the faithlessness of a system that so easily discards its heroes by betraying its promises. The deputy defense secretary clearly didn’t understand the moral imperative of Stewart’s argument. He wasn’t attacking her personally or questioning her motives, he was simply holding a powerful official accountable for the performance of the vast institution they temporarily lead. Stewart wanted to know why the DOD computers can’t talk to the VA. It was a great question. Here is the answer: “we don’t have an accurate inventory that we can pull up of what we have, where.”
It also explains the procurement disasters and massive cost overages for weapons systems like the F-35, which is more than $165 billion over budget, and the Littoral Combat ship, which may be completely ineffective in combat. It is known as the “little crappy ship” in the fleet.
The deputy secretary also talked extensively about her perspective around how the Pentagon should be covered by the American media. Let’s just say, she has strong opinions and doesn’t seem open to the idea of criticism. She didn’t really seem to understand Stewart’s point about the media’s affinity for the shiny weapons systems obscuring the important details of stories like food insecurity among America’s enlisted military families.
One thing is certain. There doesn’t seem to be a lot of coverage of enlisted troops on the pay day lending lines outside America’s military bases before pay day. Nor is there much coverage of the veterans’ suicide crisis or images of military families at the food bank. When the Department of Defense throws a half-time show these issues are no where to be found. They should be more front and center. That was Jon Stewart’s point.
Stewart spent the hour with the deputy secretary focused on Pentagon systems, waste, incompetence and the terrible impact at the bottom of the chain. He did not raise the issue of preparedness or raise the most important question at hand. Is America ready to fight and win a war in the Pacific Ocean against the Chinese Navy? The deputy secretary’s performance did not inspire confidence. Should that war come it will quickly pierce the Pentagon’s denial shielding. There will be no time for effrontery and delusion. We should have the conversations now, before an American aircraft carrier is sunk in the South China Sea by a Chinese missile with 5,000 sailors aboard.